Abstract: Consider a terrestrial free-space optical (FSO) communication system with a potential eavesdropper outside the laser beam who can capture the information through a non-line-of-sight scattering channel. We study the information security risks in this system under different atmospheric conditions and show that the risks can be neglected for the highvisibility condition while they become serious for the low-visibility situation. We further show the secrecy capacity when the eavesdropper changes locations and present a 2-D distribution. Finally, the secrecy capacity outage probability of a turbulence-induced FSO system is derived. It is found that the secure transmission system performance is very sensitive to the background radiation and required transmission rate under strong turbulence."?> Index Terms: Free-space optical communication, information security, non-line-of sight scattering (NLOS), visibility.
Introduction
Free-space optical (FSO) communication is a promising technology in future communication due to its low cost, low power, high rate, and unlicensed spectrum [1] . It provides a solution to realize communication in some special occasions when the radio frequency (RF) is prohibited or restricted. Due to the wide application prospect of FSO communication, the security issue needs to be investigated. Although FSO communication is traditionally regarded as an information secure technology, it suffers from security risks when an eavesdropper is within the laser beam as the intended receiver, for example, the eavesdropper intentionally blocks the beam to cut the line-of-sight (LOS) of the intended receiver [2] , or the footprint of the divergent beam at the receiver end is so large that it covers both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper [3] . Even when the eavesdropper is located outside the beam, it may still be able to detect the optical signals through a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) scattering channel which is generated by the atmospheric particles in the atmosphere environment. The scattering events occur over broad spectra from infrared, to visible light and ultraviolet [4] . In general, the shorter the wavelength is, the smaller the path loss is. Path loss in the ultraviolet band may be much smaller than the infrared band. Thus, ultraviolet carriers are usually adopted for the NLOS communication [5] . However, optical scattering also poses new information security concerns to be investigated.
In this paper, we study the security risks outside the laser beam of a terrestrial FSO communication link due to the potential existence of an eavesdropper who receives signals through an NLOS scattering channel. We consider the weak receive signal case which follows a Poisson channel model, such as a long-range link severely attenuated by the atmosphere. The analysis can be extended by slight modifications to any FSO link crossing the atmosphere such as ground-aircraft or ground-satellite communications. To evaluate the security of a FSO communication system with potential distributed risks outside the laser beam, we take the following steps. At first, the Kim model [6] , which is widely applied in modeling the FSO communication, is adopted to obtain the atmosphere attenuation coefficient for given wavelength and atmospheric visibility. Secondly, the link gain for the LOS channel is derived via dividing it into divergence attenuation and atmosphere attenuation [7] , [8] . The approaches to obtain the link gain of the NLOS channel are provided based on the theoretical analysis [9] , [10] , Monte Carlo ray tracing simulation [11] , and experiment evaluation [12] , [13] . Moreover, the secrecy capacity, first proposed by Wyner [14] , which defines the maximum transmission rate from the transmitter to the intended receiver keeping information strictly confidential, is adopted to evaluate the security performance of the FSO communication. Finally, the secrecy capacity outage probability, which is widely investigated in the study on the physical-layer security of the FSO communication [2] , [15] , is studied under different turbulence conditions. Through our study, the relation between the performance of the secure transmission system and the atmospheric visibility is revealed. Moreover, the secrecy capacity in accordance with different locations of the eavesdropper is analyzed, and a 2-D insecure region is geographically illustrated. Dependence of secrecy capacity outage probability on the atmospheric turbulence is also examined. These discussions and analysis are verified by numerical simulations.
System Description and Channel Model

System Description
We consider a terrestrial point-to-point FSO communication. The transmitter (Tx) aims to send information to the legitimate receiver (Rx) through the LOS channel, while there exists a potential eavesdropper (Ex) who may obtain the information from its received signal though an NLOS scattering channel. Then, the legitimate LOS link and non-legitimate NLOS link form a secure transmission system, whose geometry is shown in Fig. 1 .
In our proposed system, the position of Rx is fixed, and the position of Ex may vary but is outside the divergent laser beam. Since the eavesdropper aims to receive signals as strong as possible, we assume it tries to optimize the pointing direction to maximize the link gain of the NLOS channel while its position and field-of-view (FOV) full angle are fixed.
Channel Model
Due to the strong atmosphere attenuation, the received signal intensity becomes extremely weak. The continuous waveform cannot be obtained by a normal optical receiver, instead, a photoncounting receiver is adopted to record the number of received photoelectrons. Let P be the transmission power and E p = hc/λ be the energy per photon, where λ denotes the wavelength of laser. Let G L define the LOS link gain and let η define the receiver efficiency value. The number of detected photoelectrons per second at Rx, denoted as L , is given by
For Ex in the NLOS scattering channel, let G N denote the NLOS channel gain. The number of received photoelectrons per second at Ex is given by
Assume each data frame is divided into slots with duration time τ. And the number of detected photoelectrons in each slot satisfies Poisson distribution. Let λ sL = τ L , and λ sN = τ N denote the mean numbers of detected photoelectrons of signal component in each slot for LOS channel and NLOS channel, respectively. Assume equal background radiation for both Ex and Rx. Let λ b denote the mean number of detected photoelectrons of background radiation component in each slot. When the transmitted symbol X is "1," let y and z denote the numbers of detected photoelectrons in Rx and Ex, respectively. Then, the probability mass functions (PMF) of y and z are given by
When the transmitted symbol is "0," the numbers of detected photoelectrons in Rx and Ex both satisfy the Poisson distribution with mean λ b , which is given by
Link Gains
In this section, we show the LOS and NLOS link gains in the absence of turbulence. They represent the average link gains under turbulence when the rest conditions are identical [16] . Then, we incorporate the turbulence in the next section.
Link Gain of LOS Channel
For the LOS channel, the link gain G L consists of free-space atmosphere attenuation G L F and divergence attenuation G L D , which is given by
In the infrared communication waveband, we consider Mie scattering as the dominant factor in calculating the atmosphere attenuation. Following the Kim model, the Mie scattering coefficient given the atmosphere visibility and wavelength is given by . Thus, we have the total link gain
Link Gain of NLOS Channel
For the NLOS scattering channel, we adopt the single-scattering model which is widely applied in analyzing the path loss in scattering communication. Considering the dominance of Mie scattering and the narrow beam divergence, the link gain G N at eavesdropper's position (x, y), whose geometry is shown in Fig. 2 , can be written as following 1-D integration:
where l denotes the transmission path before the first scattering, and (l) denotes the solid angle from receiving area to the scattering point (l, 0), which is given by
where A denotes the effective receiving area. Back to (8) , L begi n and L end denote the lower and upper bounds of the integration above, which are given as follows:
where α and β denote the pointing angle and the full angle of FOV, respectively, and μ denotes the cosine of scattering angle in (l, 0), which is given by
and p (μ) denotes the scattering phase function, which represents the probability distribution of scattering angle. According to [11] , the phase function is given by
where f is a model parameter in ray-tracing simulation, and g represents the mean of μ.
Optimal Pointing Direction of Eavesdropper
Since the eavesdropper aims to receive signals as strong as possible, it needs to select the optimal pointing angle to maximize the NLOS link gain. Refer to the expression of G N in (8) . If the location and FOV of eavesdropping receiver are fixed, the link gain is only determined by its pointing direction. Note that the Mie phase function P (μ) decreases strictly and dramatically with respect to the scattering angle θ s for θ s < π/2; thus, the eavesdropper tends to select a pointing direction with small scattering angle. In the following, we will first show the optimal pointing angle α when α < π/2 − β/2. The following theorem can be obtained and proved. Theorem 1: The maximum link gain G * N of NLOS with the eavesdropper position (x, y) and FOV full-angle β can be reached by selecting the following optimal pointing angle:
. Proof: Let θ be the angle between the line from (l, 0) to (x, y) and the eavesdropper's pointing direction, which ranges from −β/2 to β/2. We have
Assume the upper bound of integration satisfies 0
where
, arctan y x − α}, and we can derive (θ) = A cos θ y 2 csc 2 (α + θ) (16) and μ(θ) = cos(α + θ). When arctan (y/x) − α < −β/2, we have
dθ. (17) Note that μ(θ) and −[x + y(1−cos(α+θ)) sin (α+θ) ] both decrease strictly with respect to α when α + θ < π/2. Due to the fact that phased function P (μ) increases with respect to μ, we have the function G N decreases strictly with respect to α when arctan (18) where θ denotes α + θ. Noting that α + β/2 and cos(θ − α) both increase with respect to α, we have G N increases strictly with respect to α when arctan (y/x) − α > −β/2. Recalling that the decreasing characteristic on previous assumption arctan . For the case of α ≥ π/2 − β/2, direct derivation of the optimal pointing angle is difficult. However, noticing that the Mie phase function P (μ) decreases dramatically with respect to the scattering angle for θ s < π/2 and only increases slightly for θ s ∈ [π/2, π], we select the α = arctan y x + β/2 as the optimal pointing angle for all eavesdropping position (x, y).
Secrecy Capacity with Atmosphere Turbulence
Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity, which is denoted by C s , is the maximum transmission rate from the transmitter to the intended receiver that maintains perfect secrecy. Let X , Y, and Z denote the signals of the Tx, Rx, and Ex, respectively. The secrecy capacity is given by C s = [I (X ; Y) − I (X ; Z )] + (19) where [f ] + = max{f, 0}. For the LOS channel, the capacity is a function of received number of photoelectrons and the duty cycle of OOK modulation. According to [17] , the mutual information I (X , Y) under a Poisson channel is given by
where q denotes the duty cycle of transmitted OOK symbol, λ sL and λ bL were defined in Section 2.2. Similar to the LOS channel, the NLOS channel can be formed as a Poisson channel as well, and the mutual information I (X ; Z ) is given by I (X ; Z ) = C(λ sN , λ b , q).
Outage Probability
Due to the atmosphere turbulence along the FSO link, the link gain cannot be considered as the constant. Instead, several statistical models have been proposed to describe the random channel fading in a FSO system. From weak to moderate turbulence strength, the Log-Normal model is well accepted and widely applied in modeling the stochastic characteristic of channel fading. Thus, the probability density function (PDF) of instantaneous link gain G L is given by
whereḠ L is the mean value of random variable G L , and log
, which is given by (see [7, p. 4 
The σ 2 r represents the variance of log G L and is denoted as Rytov variance, which characterizes the strength of turbulence over the FSO transmission link. Typically, the Rytov variance is a function of atmosphere refraction structure parameter C 2 n , the wave number k = 2π λ , and the link range d, which is written as follows:
The weak, moderate, and strong turbulences are represented by the value σ 11/6 , the random fluctuation of NLOS link gain is much weaker than that of LOS link gain. For the far-field case, the scattering region [L begi n , L begi n ] becomes very large when the FOV of the receiver is not small, and the large number of scattering events in such region may greatly weaken the irradiance fluctuation [18] . Based on the above analysis, we assume the absence of turbulence for the NLOS channel, and the link gain of NLOS channel is considered as a constant.
Assume a given minimal secure transmission rate R ≥ 0. The probability that the perfect secure communication in FSO link can not be achieved is given by
where G is the solution to equation C s = R , and the function Q (·) denotes the Gaussian Q function, which is given by
Numerical Analysis
In our simulation, the wavelength of laser is 1550 nm, the parameters g and f in the Mie phase function are set to be 0.2 (refer to [19] ) and 0.5, respectively. The full divergence angle is α d = 2 mrad. The receiving areas for Rx and Ex are both 1 cm 2 , and the FOV full-angle of Ex is set to be 40
• . We consider the transmission range for LOS link is 2 km, 5 km and 10 km, and the minimal allowable distance from eavesdropper to the laser beam axis is 2 m, 5 m, and 10 m. The link gains as a function of atmospheric visibility for the above cases are shown in Fig. 3 , where the link gain of NLOS channel is the maximal one for all allowable X-positions of eavesdropper given Y-position. Note that for high visibility, the received signal in Rx is much stronger than the received signal in Ex, thus the security problem can be neglected in this case. On the contrary, the security problem is serious for low visibility, while the solution to this problem is reducing the LOS transmission range or increasing the minimal tolerable distance from eavesdropper to the laser beam. To show the secrecy capacity of such a system, we consider the case of V = 1 km and V = 2 km. Assume the constant channel that the LOS link gains are G L = −90 dB for both two cases, and the laser power P = 1 W. Thus, the number of received photoelectrons per second is given by
Assume that SN R (   s   b   ) is 0 dB, and the duty cycle of OOK modulation q = 0.5. We show the secrecy capacity for different positions of eavesdropper in Fig. 4 . The dark blue area represents that the secrecy capacity is zero, which is named as "insecure region," whose geometry is clearly observed, together with the larger area of insecure region for V = 1 km than that for V = 2 km.
When the turbulence fluctuation is induced, the secrecy capacity outage probability need to be analyzed, we consider the case of V = 1 km, and the X-coordinate position of eavesdropper is set to be 100 m. The Fig. 5 shows the outage probabilities for different Y-coordinate positions of eavesdropper with different SNR, required secure transmission rate in bits per second, and strength of turbulence. It is seen that the outage probability increases dramatically with respect to the strength of turbulence. Moreover, the stronger turbulence also causes the larger gap between the curves of different SNR or different required rate, which indicates that the performance of secure transmission is much more sensitive to the background radiation and required rate when the stronger turbulence exists along the transmission link.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the information security risks of a FSO communication system with an eavesdropper outside the laser beam who may obtain the information through an NLOS scattering channel. We showed the security concern is negligible when the visibility is high enough. The secrecy capacity for different positions of eavesdropper was derived and analyzed. Accordingly, a security capacity map was generated in a 2-D space around the laser beam. It was found that outage probability under strong turbulence was sensitive to the background radiation and required transmission rate.
